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Introduction
Modern philosophy, the scientific revolution, 
and the Enlightenment together forged a powerful 
combination of ideas and cultural liturgies that af-
fected and continue to affect virtually every area 
of human life. One key aspect of this era and its 
effect is a tendency towards reductionism of all 
kinds. Whether in the foundationalist epistemol-
ogy of Descartes, the atomistic tendencies of physi-
cal science, or the all-encompassing metanarratives 
of “progress” in economic life, one can easily trace 
the development of this intoxicating social and in-
tellectual phenomenon. Still today, for example, 
many thinkers in the science-philosophy dialogue 
continue to wash the smell of Ernest Rutherford’s 
quip out of their clothes: “All science is either phys-
ics or stamp collecting.”1
But not everyone was (or is) on-board with the 
Enlightenment project and its tendency to funnel 
all of life down into a single principle, purpose, or 
story. The philosopher and critic Owen Barfield 
(1898-1997), along with Abraham Kuyper (1837-
1920), Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), and 
Dooyeweerd successor Roy Clouser (1937-), fiercely 
resisted this movement, earning themselves the rep-
utation of being “non-reductionists” or “anti-reduc-
tionists.”2 There is little direct relationship between 
Barfield and the aforementioned “Neocalvinists,”3 
and on the surface, these two streams of thought 
couldn’t be more different. Yet, they came to some 
of the same conclusions on this important subject 
and even according to similar reasoning. The pur-
pose of this article is to look at how and why each 
thinker addressed the problem of reductionism, 
highlight the common threads among their cri-
tiques and innovative solutions, and consider the 
enduring relevance of this particular intellectual 
sub-tradition. 
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On Reductionism
If one peruses such reference works as the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it becomes 
clear that one of the central concerns surrounding 
reductionism is a sense of exclusion or elimination. 
In order to properly peer through a microscope, for 
example, one must block off one’s vision of every-
thing else.4 It is common for reductionism to be 
associated with physicalist (i.e., materialist) reduc-
tionism and ontological eliminativism, but this 
association is not always appropriate. Idealists like 
Bishop Berkeley or Johann Fichte either denied the 
existence of matter or asserted that everything that 
is real is mental. 
A more sophisticated example is offered by 
emergentists, who speak of reduction without 
collapsing it into a fuller sense of reductionism. 
This approach can be attributed to the fact that 
“Emergent properties are irreducible to, and un-
predictable from, the lower-level phenomena from 
which they emerge.”5  More specifically, “there are 
two forms of causality that are not reducible to 
physical causes,” and (at least in Clayton’s view) 
this point is significant because “causality should 
be our primary guide to ontology.”6 A magnetic 
field generated by certain atoms in a certain state 
introduces a whole new level of reality (for a lack of 
better words), with its own properties and features 
that simply don’t exist on the lower level. Another 
example is explained by John Searle: 
Consciousness is a causally emergent property 
of systems. It is an emergent feature of certain 
systems of neurons in the same way that solidity 
and liquidity are emergent features of systems 
of molecules. The existence of consciousness 
can be explained by the causal interactions be-
tween elements of the brain at the micro level, 
but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or 
calculated from the sheer physical structure of 
the neurons without some additional account of 
the causal relations between them.7
In the broader purview of Searle’s account, 
there are at least five kinds of reductionisms: (1) 
ontological,8 (2) property ontological,9 (3) theoreti-
cal,10 (4) logical or definitional,11and (5) causal.12 
Other contemporary thinkers, including Michael 
Tooley, propose a much different fourfold schema: 
(1) “strong reductionism with respect to causal re-
lations,” (2) “weak reductionism with respect to 
causal relations,” (3) “strong reductionism with 
respect to causal laws,” (4) “weak reductionism 
with respect to causal laws.”13 It is not necessary to 
elaborate on these classifications. But it is apparent 
that there are many ways of thinking about what it 
means to “reduce”—and ways to avoid doing it; the 
results of such reduction can vary.
Despite exceptions, “Most contemporary re-
ductionist as well as eliminativist positions include 
some commitment to materialism or physicalism—
the view that the physical or material provides the 
fundamental reductive base.”14 Indeed, as Searle 
notes in the same aforementioned essay, “In gen-
eral in the history of science, successful causal re-
ductions tend to lead to ontological reductions.”15 
Tooley, likewise, observes that “the history of the 
philosophy of causation since the time of Hume 
has been largely the history of attempts to offer 
reductionist accounts of causal laws and of causal 
relations, and most philosophers have been content 
simply to assume that a reductionist approach to 
causality must be correct.”16 
This widely acknowledged trend is particularly 
vivid in the natural sciences, where the rationalist 
and materialist bent of the Enlightenment project 
comes into full swing. As the German liberation 
theologian Jürgen Moltmann so concisely put it,
The modern world began with the rise of the ex-
act sciences. The sciences became exact through 
the “reduction of science to mathematics” (re-
duction scientiae ad mathematicum). The con-
cern that guided perception was freedom from 
natural forces that were not understood, and 
the mastery over them. For Descartes, it was the 
concern to make the human being “the lord and 
possessor of nature”; for the devout Francis Ba-
con, it was the restoration of the likeness to God 
by way of lordship over the earth (dominum ter-
rae). How can power over nature be acquired 
through knowledge? Through the application 
of the old Roman method, divide et impera—
”divide and rule.” If natural formations are split 
up into their individual parts, and one perceives 
how they are put together and function, they 
can be “dominated,” and a separate formation 
can be constructed from their individual parts.17
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It was this type of reductionism—an elevation 
of the natural sciences and its methods against all 
others (along with a dogged legitimation of this el-
evation and its results)—that became a serious con-
cern to some twentieth-century thinkers. The isola-
tion, exclusion, and elimination of anything that 
doesn’t fit forged many of the key events and ideas 
of the twentieth century, which was in many ways 
an epic projection of modern values—and, notably, 
the bloodiest century in history.18
This is the broader context through which the 
work of Barfield and the Neocalvinists should be 
understood. The problem was 
not simply the rise of science 
and decline of religion; it 
was an ethos of conquering, 
controlling, and the absur-
dities resulting from break-
ing everything apart in 
hopes of mastering it. This 
epistemological colonialism 
alarmed both Barfield and 
the Neocalvinists, who took 
it upon themselves to develop viable alternatives. 
Neocalvinist Anti-Reductionism in Abraham 
Kuyper
In response to reductionism, here is the be-
ginning of Abraham Kuyper’s famous lecture 
“Uniformity: The Curse of Modern Life” (April 
22, 1869), delivered from the stage of the Odeon 
Theater in Amsterdam:  
Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe I am within 
the scope of this lecture series if this evening I 
ask you to consider with me, from a Christian-
historical viewpoint, the false uniformity of 
our age. This phenomenon is of great interest 
precisely because the sustained drive of our age 
toward uniformity is such a dubious feature—I 
dare say, the curse—of modern life.19 
Kuyper was both a theologian and a statesman 
who tried to make sense of his Calvinist religious 
heritage during one of the most tumultuous pe-
riods of human history. During his lifetime, he 
witnessed the immediate effects of the Industrial 
Revolution, global trade, colonialism and mass im-
migrations, the rise of nation states and political 
revolutions, and the rise of the modern university 
and new fields of study that (seemed to) threaten re-
ligion itself (e.g., higher criticism, textual criticism, 
theories of religious origins, Darwinian evolution, 
economics, anthropology, psychology, etc.), not to 
mention the first World War. While he is known 
for many things, perhaps his most well-known 
intellectual contribution is “sphere sovereignty”—
against the backdrop of political hegemony and the 
modern dualism of sacred vs. secular. Sphere sov-
ereignty was the more practical version of a fuller 
non-reductionist philosophy that was later devel-
oped by his followers.
As an “anti-revolution-
ary” politician and eventual-
ly the Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands (1901-1905), 
Kuyper was concerned with 
upholding order, explains 
Lew Daly: “Like Groen, 
Kuyper opposed the secu-
larism and individualism of 
the French Revolution as the 
most dangerous threat to a just social order. These 
modes of thought threatened to destroy the natu-
ral community by elevating individuals and allying 
them, through individual rights, with the secular 
state—hence the ‘anti-revolutionary’ response in 
Dutch politics.”20 
Kuyper himself put it this way:  “In a Calvinistic 
sense we understand, hereby, that the family, busi-
ness, science, art and so forth are all social spheres, 
which do not owe their existence to the State, and 
which do not derive the law of their life from the 
superiority of the state, but obey a high authority 
within their own bosom; an authority which rules, 
by the grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the 
State does.”21
As a theologian, Kuyper was also concerned 
about the preservation of the church and maintain-
ing its relevance to every area of life. In his view, 
there are no disciplines or domains of creation that 
are truly secular, as everything is under the direction 
of the one, true Sovereign. As religious life became 
more and more compartmentalized, marginalized, 
and alienated in modern society, it became neces-
sary for the church to actively reclaim God’s reign 
over each area of life. Kuyper’s response was the 
The isolation, exclusion, 
and elimination of 
anything that doesn‘t fit 
forged many of the key 
events and ideas of the 
twentieth century ….
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model of sphere sovereignty: “God established the 
institutions of various kinds, and to each of these 
He awarded a certain measure of power. He thus 
divided the power He had available for distribution. 
He did not give all his power to one single institu-
tion but gave to every one of these institutions the 
power that coincided with its nature and calling.”22
This model addressed two contemporary prob-
lems: the reduction of religious life to a marginal-
ized role (e.g., morality and spiritual things), and 
the centralization of political power that over-
stepped its bounds and threatened national inde-
pendence. Together, the forces of modernity threat-
ened cultural diversity in general, and Kuyper’s 
modified Reformed theology (hence neocalvinism) 
was the answer.
Yet this model was formulated within the frame-
work of classical western theism and high Calvinist 
theology (hence neocalvinism), as evidenced in 
specific linguistic choices of the model: “There is 
a domain of nature in which the Sovereign exerts 
power over matter according to fixed laws. There 
is also a domain of the personal, of the household, 
of science, of social and ecclesiastical life, each of 
which obeys its own laws of life, each subject to its 
own chief.23
The metaphors for God and power are political 
(perhaps even feudalistic): “Sovereign,” “domain,” 
“power,” “fixed laws,” “obeys,” “subject to,” “chief.” 
Far from being theologically neutral (which, Kuyper 
realized in other contexts, is impossible),24 these 
terms reinforce certain conceptions about God, 
creation, and human relationships.25 However, for 
Kuyper, still steeped in post-Reformation scholas-
ticism, this framework was simply the “biblical” 
one and therefore the “right” one; he saw himself 
as merely relaying timeless, permanent truths in yet 
a constructive manner that addressed the problems 
of his time.26 
This tradition also, ironically, exhibited its own 
reductionistic baggage such as the self-authenticat-
ing Scripture27 within theological methodology.28 
How consistent this overall model was in either 
protecting against the encroachments of the state or 
re-empowering the church is also debatable.29 Note, 
for instance, that the state’s purpose was to “make 
it possible for the various [social] spheres, insofar as 
they manifest themselves externally, to interact ap-
propriately, and to keep each sphere within its prop-
er limits.”30 In addition, every sphere (e.g., church, 
school, business, etc.) was responsible for submit-
ting to the justice of the single state. Kuyper main-
tained this hierarchy of power in the home under 
exceptionally rigid patriarchal ideas.31 There have 
also been concerns about how much Kuyper exag-
gerated the situation, whether about women’s cul-
tural place32 or the impacts of racial intermixing.33
Despite these issues, Kuyper’s anti-imperialism 
and anti-reductionistic goals were both under-
standable and explicit, and they were an outgrowth 
of the larger problem of uniformity that he had 
railed against a decade earlier. There, on the stage 
in Amsterdam, he elaborated the totalizing nature 
of uniformity: “Its attempts to blend all shades into 
the blank darkness of the grave are becoming ever 
obvious. Even more shrilly it cries out that in our 
modern society, everything, however distinctive 
in nature, must be shaped by one model, cut to a 
single pattern, poured into one fixed mold.”34
There was no facet of human life or field of 
knowledge that wasn’t stained by this reductionis-
tic tendency; it could be found with regard to archi-
tecture, city design, the collapsing of gender roles, 
language, science and biology,35 and especially pub-
lic and political life.36 As he stated in exasperation, 
“So here we are. Everything has to be equalized and 
leveled; all diversity must be whittled down…[un-
til] every difference disappears.”37
Neocalvinist Anti-Reductionism in 
Dooyeweerd and Roy Clouser
Around the time of Kuyper’s death, Herman 
Dooyeweerd had finished his secondary educa-
tion at a Neocalvinist school and was attending 
Kuyper’s Free University (Amsterdam) to study 
law. There, Dooyeweerd was disappointed that 
he didn’t see Kupyer’s version of Calvinism being 
applied to jurisprudence.  There, explains Roger 
Henderson, “He saw a need for ‘the philosophical 
legal foundations of jurisprudence,’ and was even-
tually drawn to a study of the philosophy of law for 
this purpose.”38 
After Dooyeweerd brainstormed with his friend 
and brother-in-law Dirk Vollenhoven, his interests 
quickly expanded. The two of them began “work-
ing on questions of epistemology and the founda-
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tions of science from a Christian point of view. 
From the 1920 letter, we know that one topic of 
their discussion was the source of epistemological 
norms, and the nature and basis of their validity.”39 
By 1922-23, Dooyeweerd realized that Kuyper’s 
idea of sphere sovereignty could be applied to ju-
risprudence and epistemology in general. As each 
sphere is ruled by its own type of laws, Dooyweerd 
stated the following:   
[It}is understandable that the newly arising ref-
ormational philosophy … would only acknowl-
edge a biblically anchored 
idea of law and its corre-
late, the creaturely subjec-
tum, as its basic philosoph-
ical ideas .… Each fact of 
human life is subject to 
its own law. Things have 
their own place and act 
in response to their own 
laws, the laws holding for 
them. This is why scholarly 
thought is unable to group 
variety under a single com-
mon denomination, law 
or logic …. [And]no sin-
gle explanation can be produced by analytical 
means which will furnish us with a legitimate 
idea of unity.40
Instead of Kuyper’s societal spheres, Dooyweerd’s 
thought proposed epistemological spheres—though 
these two larger categories were connected. “Natural 
law,” for example, simply is the epistemology of the 
sphere of government. This way of thinking of-
fered a better alternative to the dualisms of scho-
lastic Thomism, the antimonies of Kant, and the 
epistemological problems of idealism and realism.41 
Dooyeweerd was “both a pluralist and an antireduc-
tionist; he accepted the diversity of created reality as 
basic.”42
Dooyeweerd proposed fifteen modal law 
spheres:43
• Spatial: continuous extension
• Kinematic: flowing movement
• Physical: energy, matter
• Biotic/Organic: life functions, self-main-
tenance
• Sensitive/Psychic: feeling and response
• Analytical: distinction, conceptualization
• Formative: formative power, achievement, 
technology, technique
• Lingual: symbolic communication
• Social: social interaction
• Economic: frugal use of resources
• Aesthetic: harmony, surprise, fun
• Juridical: due (rights, responsibility)
• Ethical: self-giving love
• Pistic: faith, vision, commitment, belief.
For Dooyeweerd, this proposal came with a 
few caveats, as explained 
by Henderson.  First, all 
concrete entities function 
in every sphere; so (for ex-
ample), “anything can be an 
object of justice.”44 Second, 
all spheres are intercon-
nected and coherent; they 
display elements of each 
other. Third, “A conflict be-
tween legality and morality 
is impossible because both 
orders cover different ter-
rains.”45 (One might com-
pare this point loosely/analogically with the view 
of NOMA, “Non-Overlapping Magisteria,” in the 
science-religion conversation.46) 
The problem, however, was how any of the 
spheres relate to each of the others. In Dooyeweerd’s 
thought, this relationship constitutes the cos-
monomic law idea, and this law idea could only 
originate (rightly) from basic religious conviction, 
or (erroneously) as an absolutization of one of the 
law spheres. Either way, this step towards unity was 
religious: “However hard human reason, which is 
subject to the law, strains itself to construct a ratio-
nal unity between the independent spheres of law, 
it will never succeed. This is a modern repetition of 
the tower of Babel!... Undoubtedly there is a unity, 
a divine synthesis in God’s creative plan; but unity 
is a supra-rational one.47
Hence, the title of the major work by 
Dooyweerd’s successor Roy Clouser was The Myth 
of Religious Neutrality. Clouser’s reformulation of 
Dooyeweerd’s thought begins with a discussion 
surrounding the question “what is a theory?”48 
There, the problem of reductionism via mental ab-
By 1922-23, 
Dooyeweerd realized 
that Kuyper‘s idea of 
sphere sovereignty 
could be applied to 
jurisprudence and 
epistemology in 
general.
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straction comes to the fore: “By abstracting proper-
ties, we create the possibility of asking about the 
relations between these properties, and of looking 
for patterns of connections among those relations, 
all of which are being conceived in isolation from 
any things or events in which they may occur.”49 
Abstraction is virtually a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for the kind of reductionism 
Clouser is critiquing. 
In addition, laws come into the picture because 
they are “the most important of the relations that 
can be discovered” in theories.50 Such “properties-
and-laws have been abstracted and made into spe-
cific areas of study.”51 Clouser calls these areas “as-
pects,” and he calls the study of them “sciences.” 
The fifteen aspects are “only intended to help us 
understand the major branches of present-day 
theory making, not to arrive at the one true list of 
genuine aspects of the world.”52 
This practice in epistemology is inescapable: 
“Without the abstraction of entire aspects, it would 
not be possible to specify the kind of properties be-
ing investigated or the kind of laws being used to 
explain whatever a theory is seeking to explain…. 
[Thus] the abstraction of aspects is essential to the-
orizing.”53 The problem with modernity, then, was 
that it went from necessary abstraction to absolutiz-
ing abstraction.
Like Dooyeweerd, Clouser highlighted the 
challenge of relating aspects to a general theory (on-
tology in philosophy) and identifying its religious 
nature. The problem of western philosophy was its 
reducing all of life to the properties and laws of one 
or two spheres, without realizing the organic, web-
like construction of knowledge—and therefore of 
reality.54 Doing so would be like looking at a bead-
ed necklace and saying, “this bead is holding them 
altogether” instead of pointing at the string inside 
all of them. As Andrew Basden explains, “No as-
pect can be reduced to others, and this proposal 
explains the diversity. Yet no aspect can be isolat-
ed from the others, and this explains the unity.”55 
Further, as Clouser explains, this framework avoids 
the pitfall of scientism: “Experiments, although de-
sirable, are often not possible and a theory is not 
discarded just because it is not subject to experi-
mental testing…. [And] while it is true that there 
are philosophical theories that have opposed one 
another for centuries, this is not because theories of 
science are always provable while the philosophical 
theories never are, nor is it because of the presence 
or lack of experiments.”56
Thus, Dooyweerd’s and Clouser’s understand-
ing of aspects, knowledge, and interrelations of 
knowledge directly addresses the central problem 
of empiricism and scientific reductionism.
Anti-Reductionism in Barfield  
Barfield’s anti-reductionist philosophy is far 
less systematic than Clouser’s aspectual philosophy 
and less politically oriented than Kuyper’s sphere 
sovereignty. Barfield was concerned with education 
(relating to knowledge), and especially linguistics 
(relating to meaning).
The recent move away from classical liberal arts 
education towards economic specialization and 
compartmentalization at the modern university 
deeply concerned Barfield. More concerning, how-
ever, were the toxic assumptions underneath this 
social phenomenon, which was creatively explored 
in his fictional work, Worlds Apart. In it, a physicist, 
biologist, psychiatrist, lawyer-philologist, linguistic 
analyst, theologian, retired schoolteacher, and em-
ployee of a rocket research station get together at 
a summit meeting and discuss the problem of the 
“disagreeable impression of watertight compart-
ments.”57 Can such specialists have a meaningful 
conversation with each other and integrate their 
knowledge in practical ways? As focused as the 
question seems, this diverse roster is enough to 
launch the conversation down a number of rabbit 
trails.  
Not far into the initial phases of the meeting, 
the reductionistic tendencies of science come to 
the fore: “This is where modern science came in. 
Its whole basis—the very thing that was new about 
it—was the assumption that, if you want to know 
about things, you must assume that they are merely 
things. You must treat them as objects for the sens-
es, but as independent in all other respects of man 
and his spirit and his values.58 
With this basic problem on the table, the im-
possibility of objectivity in epistemology becomes 
a talking point: “First they [science enthusiasts] 
insist on cutting out awe and reverence and wis-
dom and substituting sophistication as the goal of 
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knowledge; and then they talk about this method 
of theirs with reverence and awe and expect us to 
look up to them as wise and venerable men.”59 In 
other words, there is a double-standard when it 
comes to the elevation of hard science; it wants 
to be seen as not only neutral (i.e, unhindered by 
those pesky subjective or religious motivations) but 
even more than neutral (i.e., inherently admirable 
and respectable) at the same time.60 
The modern, scientific, and foundationalist epis-
temology comes with a hidden risk: “Haven’t you got 
simply a huge inverted pyra-
mid of ideas—mathematics, 
if you like—erected on a tiny 
apex of ascertained facts?” 
asks the character Sanderson 
[most closely representing 
Barfield’s own views]. “An 
apex that is getting smaller 
and smaller every day? More 
and more piled on less and 
less?”61 
Eventually, the charac-
ter Hunter (the theologian) 
pushes this issue further to 
show the impossibility of religious neutrality: 
“I have been trying to show you [character Up-
water] that you yourself are a supernaturalist—
in the sense in which you are using the word—
because you always do in practice assume that 
there is something other than the total process 
of irrational nature, and that we participate in 
that other every time we think a valid thought 
…. [Y]ou can never, without talking nonsense, 
obliterate the ultimate cleavage between (a) 
consciousness itself and (b) that of which it is 
conscious …. Your denial is like a sentence con-
sisting of the words ‘This is not a sentence.’”62
One might immediately note that the assertion 
about “the total process of nature” and our partici-
pation in it is remarkably similar to Dooyeweerd’s 
cosmonomic law idea. Furthermore, the supernatu-
ralist presumption is essentially the same point 
made by Clouser regarding the role of “religion.”63
The dialogue continues as Barfield tells a short 
story that largely overlaps contemporary emergen-
tists.64 It also introduces Barfield’s more linguistic-
oriented critique of reductionism. The story is about 
a person visiting a university, where he is intro-
duced to all the “colleges,” but who, after the tour 
is over, asks, “but where’s the university?” After this 
somewhat humorous ending, Dunn (the “linguist 
philosopher”) is asked if it is good and useful at all 
to have the word “university” refer to all the “col-
leges.” Dunn responds,  
“Yes, of course it is. Not only useful but neces-
sary for a large number of practical purposes. The 
confusion only arises—and this is the moral of 
the story—if you start fancying that the univer-
sity is itself one of the col-
leges, or so much like one 
of the colleges that you can 
say things about it which 
only have any meaning 
when they are said of col-
lege-buildings …. [I]ntro-
duce a word like ‘university’ 
into a sentence to which 
only words like ‘college’ be-
long, and you will be talk-
ing nonsense, though you 
may believe you are saying 
something very original 
and very exciting.”65
This pithy lesson is then used to sharply correct 
the classic problem of mind-brain reductionism: 
Dunn: “No one but a fool would argue that the 
word ‘mind’ and the word ‘brain’ mean the same 
thing. But the question whether some supposed 
thing called ‘the mind’ is or is not the same 
thing as something else called ‘the brain’ is a 
question that cannot be answered for the simple 
reason that it cannot be asked.”
Ranger: “But it was asked!”
Dunn: “So was the question ‘And now where 
is the university?’ Can’t you see the point? As 
Hunter said yesterday, the obvious is the hard-
est thing of all to point out to anyone who is 
genuinely aware of it.”66
Here one sees how important the linguistic di-
mension can be—because abstraction and reduc-
tion occur through language.67 It is no wonder that 
Barfield begins his seminal work, Poetic Diction, by 
showing the absurdity of such totalizing: 
Like Dooyeweerd, 
Clouser highlighted the 
challenge of relating 
aspects to a general 
theory (ontology 
in philosophy) and 
identifying its religious 
nature.
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It is a failing common to a good many con-
temporary metaphysical theories that they can 
be applied to all things except themselves but 
that, when so applied, they extinguish them-
selves; and experience has taught me that when 
men are really attached to such a theory, most 
of them will, after this has been pointed out to 
them, continue nevertheless to apply it to all 
things (except itself ). The reason is rather that 
those who must think about language and the 
world in that particular way have gone further 
since then and abolished the idea of a “referent” 
altogether.68 
Barfield here put his finger on an important 
trend that would come into fruition in the work of 
the 1960s-70s’ French intellectuals:  modernism’s 
reductionism in language gave birth to the ultra-re-
ductionistic postmodern idea of non/self-referential 
language, where “there is no outside text” (Derrida) 
and “socialization … goes all the way down” 
(Rorty).69  Barfield took issue with this suggestion 
on several occasions,70 and at the forefront of this 
problem is logical positivism: 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, 
which Bertrand Russell translated into Eng-
lish in 1922, … [is the] broom with which …
[he] hoped to sweep away, as meaningless, all 
statements not related to physically observable 
or verifiable events, to limit the sphere of man’s 
knowledge to the increasingly tentative findings 
of physical science, and to dismiss all other af-
firmations as meaningless. For all propositions 
except those from which some observation-
statement can be deduced are, as it averred, 
meaningless, either as misuses of language, or 
as tautologies.71
Barfield pulls no punches about how dangerous 
this trajectory really is: 
Before he even begins to write, the Logical Posi-
tivist has taken the step from “I prefer not to 
interest myself in propositions which cannot be 
empirically verified” to “all propositions which 
cannot be empirically verified are meaningless.” 
The next step to “I shall legislate to prevent 
anyone else wasting his time on meaningless 
propositions” is unlikely to appear either illogi-
cal or negative to his successor in title. Those 
who mistake efficiency for meaning inevitably 
end by loving compulsion, even if it takes them, 
like Bernard Shaw, the best part of a lifetime to 
get there.72
The quip about mistaking “efficiency for mean-
ing” deserves special comment. These words were 
written in the age of automobile assembly lines, the 
“Roaring ‘20s,” and the central banking experi-
ments of Keynesian economics. Never before was 
the world producing so much—all by the division 
of labor, specialization of disciplines, and rigorous 
application of physical science—in a word, the 
“old Roman way” of “dividing and conquering” 
(Moltmann). Barfield then asks the obvious and 
extremely relevant question: “What is efficiency 
without meaning?”73
Barfield was clear: when scientific reductionism 
takes over language itself, the result is meaningless-
ness in the way that people use language. It is for the 
same reason that if words are isolated from sen-
tences, the sentence is no longer an organic whole 
of any semantic value. To use another analogy, if 
all language forms (literal, symbolic, figurative) are 
reduced to binary code or math, the result is an 
obliteration of human experience. (A poet under-
stands this better than anyone else.) He wrote, “If 
therefore they succeed in expunging from language 
all the substance of its past, in which it is naturally 
so rich, and finally converting it into the species of 
algebra that is best adapted to the use of indoctri-
nation and empirical science, a long and important 
step forward will have been taken in the selfless 
cause of the liquidation of the human spirit.74
Barfield believed that science and logic can 
clarify and empower but have their limits.75 When 
they don’t, they drag all of life down through the 
microscope and into the dark void. “Science deals 
with the world which it perceives,” he warns, “but 
seeking more and more to penetrate the veil of na-
ïve perception, progresses only towards the goal of 
nothing.”76 Indeed, for Barfield, true science does 
not set the agenda for the human race, or even for 
knowledge, for “Only by imagination … can the 
world be known. And what is needed is, not only 
that larger and larger telescopes and more and 
more sensitive calipers should be constructed, but 
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that the human mind should become increasingly 
aware of its own creative activity.”77
In the book of nature, the whole may mean 
something, but the details mean nothing; or if 
they do, we can never know it. The opposite is true, 
Barfield explains, when we read an actual book. 
There the meaning of the whole is articulated from 
the meaning of each part—chapters from sentences 
and sentences from words—and stands before us 
in clear, sharp outlines.78 The vital question with 
which Barfield deals is whether science can ever 
discover how to read the book of nature in this way. 
It would not matter so much 
if its field were limited to 
mechanics and physics. But, 
in fact, man looks more and 
more to science for guid-
ance on all subjects. As we 
rise in the scale of creation 
from the lifeless to the living 
and from the living to the 
psychic and human—from 
mechanics to sociology—
the question of the mean-
ing of what we are dealing 
with becomes ever more insistent. He wonders if 
this pursuit of meaning must always be ignored or 
if science ever learns to supplement its weighing, 
measuring, and statistics with the systematic use of 
imagination.79
In a word, then, human abstractions and reduc-
tions for the sake of categorization and knowledge 
can never be immortalized and made permanent—
at least if one is looking for meaning. This is be-
cause meaning is the result of zooming out, of plac-
ing atoms, words, and persons inside a larger con-
text. Hence, he writes famously, “Words are only 
themselves by being more than themselves. Perhaps 
the same thing is true of human beings.”80 
Similarities and Divergences
Upon further reflection, a number of inordi-
nately specific parallels between Barfield and the 
Neocalvinists’ anti-reductionism campaign emerge. 
For example, it is noteworthy that Kuyper’s succes-
sor Herman Bavinck made the same point for the 
“book of scripture” that Barfield made above for 
the “book of nature.” This is the Neocalvinist doc-
trine of “organic inspiration.” As Bavinck writes, 
“Organic inspiration is ‘graphic’ inspiration, and 
it is foolish to distinguish inspired thoughts from 
words and words from letters. Scripture must not 
be read atomistically, as though each word or let-
ter by itself has its own divine meaning. Words are 
included in thoughts and vowels in words. The full 
humanity of human language is taken seriously 
in the notion of organic inspiration.”81 This “or-
ganic” model was meant to avoid the reductionism 
of “dictation theory” and “verbal plenary inspira-
tion” of the written text itself (an idea central to 
B. B. Warfield, Bavinck’s 
American colleague at Old 
Princeton).
Barfield’s passionate ar-
guments are extremely simi-
lar to Kuyper’s lecture on 
the “Curse of Uniformity,” 
especially Barfield’s reflec-
tions on social equalities. 
“The principle of equality is 
both a curse and a blessing,” 
Barfield opines. “It is a bless-
ing, and an indispensable 
one, where it belongs, particularly for instance, in 
the rule of law: it is a curse when it takes the bit 
between its teeth, or goes to and fro like a roaring 
lion, seeking what it may devour, because then it 
involves the reduction of human relations to side-
by-sideness, as I’ve called it, and so it eliminates 
mutual participation.”82 Kuyper and Clouser would 
have applauded. The same goes for Barfield’s dis-
tinction between subject (conscious perceiver) and 
object (the perceived), which modernism threat-
ened to collapse. 
Furthermore, it is more generally clear that 
the topic and systematic activity of abstraction is 
as central for Barfield, in his non-reductionist en-
terprise, as for Clouser. Scientists in the natural 
sciences regularly forget that in their work of find-
ing “material causes” and “classification,” they are 
in the business of downward-facing (i.e., “lower-
level”) abstraction.83 Because the modern sciences 
were carried away with their own accomplishments 
and Enlightenment optimism, they assumed that 
they knew how language worked (and had worked). 
But they were unaware that a scientific revolution 
Barfield was clear: 
when scientific 
reductionism takes 
over language 
itself, the result is 
meaninglessness in 
the way that people 
use language.
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is intimately connected with a linguistic revolution:
The system of mental constructs called math-
ematics is, I suppose, about as “self-referring” a 
language form as could well be imagined—and 
yet it is also effective outside itself, effective both 
in discovery and in operation. So much so, that 
it has given birth to our present technological 
civilization. But it is only by returning from 
time to time from the informal language to the 
formal language of description that this connec-
tion with the natural process can be maintained. 
Bohm maintains moreover that the unresolved 
duality between the two language forms has 
been operating to conceal the revolutionary 
change in language form which has in fact been 
taking place. There has been a steadily increas-
ing tendency to assume that informal language 
forms no longer matter much, and that all the 
real business of physics is transacted in formal 
language—its informal brother being confined 
to those invented “models,” whose sole function 
is to give to the poor layman with no mathe-
matics some sort of fanciful picture of what is 
being (or perhaps is not being) talked about.84  
Modernism privileged the quantifiable and lit-
eral, and undermined the metaphorical and figura-
tive—to the continued peril of all. 
But perhaps the most interesting (and ironi-
cally) shared ground between Barfield and the 
Neocalvinists is their belief in the unity and oneness 
of the universe—ironic because, in some sense, it is 
possibly the highest form of reductionism and ab-
straction. For Kuyper, the universe is God’s creation, 
not to be confused with the Creator, and everything 
that is not-God is created. For Clouser, the same re-
mains true, but the unification of all the aspects of 
creation is based on logical necessity (i.e., the string 
holding the beads together). For Barfield, the the-
osophist, “Spirit…is not that which is perceived, but 
that which is. It is not what we perceive, but what we 
are.”85 And “it seems clear to me that by ‘spirit’ we 
must mean ‘that which is not matter,’ and by ‘that 
which is not matter’ we mean that part of the totality 
which is not perceptible through the senses. If the to-
tality is ultimately one, as I hold (with Leibniz), then 
it is perhaps better to speak of one phase of the total-
ity rather than one part of it.”86 These are totalizing 
ideas—and powerful ones, since the history of reli-
gion has shown this “upward-reductionism” (zoom-
ing out: religion, philosophy) to be as potentially 
intoxicating as “downward-reductionism” (zooming 
in: physics, biology).87 
Thankfully, these thinkers are generally aware 
of the weight of what they are suggesting, and they 
contend that meaning is not found simply in zoom-
ing out to the forest but in the process of zooming 
in and out from the big to the small altogether. 
However, this all-encompassing perspective on the 
universe, even if undeveloped, is an important re-
minder that even in the context of anti-reductionist 
philosophy and theology, it is impossible to escape 
generalities and making assertions about the whole 
of which one knows perhaps very little. 
The biggest points of divergence are probably in 
the role of theological starting points. Barfield does 
not make his arguments on the basis of classical, 
Western monotheism (much less a Calvinist flavor). 
He acknowledges something proprietary about the 
Christian story; but, in the context of his intellec-
tual concern with the “evolution of consciousness,” 
he contends that “we are approaching a time when 
no individual path to salvation, or what you will, 
will be valid for men, which does not also take con-
sciously up into itself the longer agony of history.”88 
He believes in a “Divine Spirit,” through whom all 
persons are connected, and who can be experienced 
in multiple religious traditions. His critique is more 
directly practical and aesthetic: a world that con-
tinues along this trajectory will crush “the human 
spirit” entirely. 
Kuyper and the Neocalvinists, however, argue 
from an explicitly theological orientation: scientific 
reductionism and the curse of uniformity is wrong 
chiefly because it goes against God’s plan for cre-
ation.89 A nation-state that continues along this tra-
jectory will result in a colorless, godless, and dan-
gerously untraditional/progressive environment. 
Despite these differences and others,90 however, 
they seem to matter little in the broader conclu-
sions that each draws. 
Resonances of Anti-Reductionism Today
Barfield’s and the Neocalvinists’ anti-reduc-
tionist philosophies are probably best viewed as 
overlapping, complementary projects. The sense of 
“reductionism,” which each philosophy critiques, 
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is primarily scientific empiricism (in epistemology) 
and, with it, physicalist materialism (in ontology), 
the results of which are shown to be devastating to 
individuals and societies. Both philosophies locate 
the genesis of problems in the uncritical abstraction 
of ideas through language, and both treat the epis-
temological colonialism of modern thought (espe-
cially in the rise in prestige of the natural sciences) 
as a threat to civilization. The distinctive work of 
Kuyper and Clouser causes onlookers to pause and 
ask what we are losing by the changing cultural 
customs in society and in the new relationships 
among family, church, edu-
cation, and state, and if God 
is being honored. Barfield’s 
distinctive work asks, “If 
meaninglessness is the re-
sult, what good is scientific 
reductionism? And how di-
vergent must specialists and 
scholars be before their in-
ability to integrate their re-
search threatens the pursuit 
of knowledge itself?” 
The ongoing importance 
of this subject can be illus-
trated in many ways. But one illustration will suf-
fice as a point of closure; it is an essay by Murray 
Rae titled “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation,” 
in the recent book Christ and the Created Order: 
Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science.91 
There, Rae essentially reiterates the arguments of 
Barfield regarding meaning and the problem of sci-
entific reductionism—and with just as much pas-
sion. Only instead of poetry, Rae’s analogy is music 
(particularly, a piece by Chopin). The fact that this 
kind of argument is still being made—and appears 
in a volume of this kind—suggests much about its 
enduring importance. Allow me to quote at length: 
Within its own level of explanation, the science 
of acoustics could in theory deliver an exhaus-
tive account of the sounds that combine to pro-
duce Chopin’s ballade, of the way those sounds 
are produced through the vibration of strings 
on a piano, and even of the unique reverber-
ant environment produced when the ballade 
is played on a particular piano in a particular 
venue under particular ambient conditions. Yet 
no one with even a modicum of musical sensi-
tivity is likely to be convinced that this scientific 
description of the material alterations involved 
in producing a performance of Chopin’s ballade 
constitutes an exhaustive description of the re-
ality in question. No explanation has yet been 
given as to why Chopin ordered the sounds as 
he did …. All these alterations in the physical 
environment are products of Chopin’s inten-
tion, but no amount of study of these material 
realities alone will sufficiently reveal what that 
intention was. An order may be discerned, har-
monies may be recognized, and a satisfying co-
herence may emerge, but 
if they are divorced from 
the life of the composer 
himself, the order, the har-
monies, and the melodic 
coherence of sounds will 
not reveal the full scope 
of Chopin’s intent, mar-
vel at them though we 
may. Indeed, we may mar-
vel. There is no reason to 
doubt, and experience may 
easily confirm, that a per-
son who listens to the bal-
lade without knowing who 
composed it can be profoundly moved.
 The musicologist could explain the ways the 
several melodic themes are woven together. And 
so on. Truth is communicated by these means, 
but none of them sufficiently captures the reality 
before us. Those tempted in this instance to wield 
Occam’s razor will leave us bereft. They will leave 
us knowing less than there is to be known …. 
The sciences contribute their expertise to exam-
ine and explain how the world is ordered; poets 
and visual artists and musicians help us see in a 
different light the complex interdependence of 
things; economists, political theorists, and social 
scientists give insight into the working of hu-
man culture and society, while historians provide 
a further means of contemplating the realms of 
human action and discerning the consequences 
of what we do. All these disciplines and more 
contribute to our understanding of the world. 92
No sector of human knowledge has a monopoly 
on all the rest. The world is rightly experienced as 
Barfield‘s and 
the Neocalvinists‘ 
anti-reductionist 
philosophies are 
probably best viewed 
as overlapping, 
complementary 
projects.
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one and as many, and these are complementary 
features, not incommensurable realities. While nei-
ther Barfield nor the Neocalvinist project is with-
out its problems or inconsistencies, both argued 
for these conclusions in a world that needed them. 
In today’s world, which is still as modern as post-
modern and encourages all the worst aspects of re-
ductionistic epistemologies—generalizations about 
race (i.e., scientific racism), sex, gender, national-
ity, religion—and in a post-COVID world, which 
seems bent on either complete uncritical obedience 
or disobedience to the scientific establishment, the 
relevance of Christian anti-reductionist thought re-
mains is as great as ever. 
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